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We construct a model of trade with heterogeneous retailers to examine the
eﬀects of trade liberalization on retail market structure, imports and social
welfare. We are especially interested in investigating the transmission of lower
import prices into consumer prices and the eﬀects of retail market regulation.
The paper shows that changes in import prices may have large eﬀects on
consumer prices and import volumes when changes in retail market structure
are taken into account, and that restrictions on retailing, as they occur in
several countries, may signiﬁcantly alter this transmission mechanism by
reducing imports and raising consumer prices.
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The purpose of this paper is to show that the retailing sector plays an impor-
tant role for our understanding of the impact of trade liberalization. To show
this, we concentrate our attention on (i) the eﬀects of trade liberalization on
the structure and performance of the domestic retailing sector; (ii) how the
structure of retail markets aﬀects the transmission of external shocks, such
as a reduction in trade barriers, into domestic consumer prices; and (iii)
how retail market regulation aﬀects market structure, imports and consumer
prices. To study these issues we build a simple model of international trade
with heterogeneous retailers and endogenous markups.
We investigate these issues in a model based on Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008) who consider the selection of heterogeneous producers into export
markets in a model with endogenous markups. By contrast, in our model it
is retailers and thus importers that are heterogeneous. In fact, we neutralize
the eﬀects of trade liberalization on the production side of the economy by
holding producer prices ﬁxed. This modeling approach allows us to highlight
the eﬀects of trade liberalization on changes in retail market structure and
on the consequences for consumers and welfare.
Our approach is motivated by several stylized facts. First, the structure
of retail markets has changed dramatically in recent decades. Market con-
centration has increased markedly, driven by the emergence of large national
chains operating large establishments.1 At the same time there has been con-
siderable entry and exit by ﬁrms. In fact, entry and exit rates have been much
higher in retailing than in manufacturing (see Jarmin et al., 2004).2 Second,
this concentration process has had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on international trade,
as large retailers increasingly import consumer goods fromlow-wage countries
1Whereas large retail ﬁrms (with at least 100 establishments) represented 18.6% of US
retail sales in 1967, their share has increased to 36.9% in 1997, and the average size of
these establishments is twice as large as it was 40 years ago. Overall, the retail and man-
ufacturing sectors have similar ratios of single to multi-unit ﬁrms but, not surprisingly,
multi-unit retailers operate more establishments on average than multi-unit manufactur-
ers. More signiﬁcantly, the number of establishments operated by multi-unit retailers has
increased dramatically between 1977 and 1997 whereas it has decreased in manufacturing
during the same period (Jarmin et al., 2005).
2According to Foster et al. (2006), productivity gains in retailing have been due almost
exclusively to the entry and exit process. Caves (1998) also reports that, although entrants
exhibit size heterogeneity at the time of entry, entry and exit are concentrated in the
smallest size classes.
1like China. Basker and Van (2010), for instance, ﬁnd that over the period
1997 to 2002 U.S. imports from China and other less-developed countries rose
especially quickly in retail sectors with the largest consolidation into chains.
Wal-Mart alone accounts for 15% of total US imports from China (Basker
and Van, 2008).3 This phenomenon is not limited to the United States and
is taking place in many retail segments, including electronics, computers,
cameras, housewares, toys, games, clothing, and footwear.4
What makes our model useful is that it allows us to address several im-
portant policy issues. First, in many consumer-good industries the bene-
ﬁts consumers may reap from trade liberalization depend crucially on how
changes in import prices aﬀect retail market structure, since distribution
margins (i.e., retail costs and retailer mark-ups) often account for 30 to 50
percent of the retail prices of consumer goods (Campa and Goldberg, 2006).
Any change in the cost structure and competition in the retail sector thus
has a large impact on retail prices and, more generally, on the gains from
trade. By linking the transmission of import prices into consumer prices to
a structural model of retail markets, we are able to shed new light on this
issue. Speciﬁcally, we decompose the degree of transmission of import prices
into the average domestic retail price into several distinct eﬀects including
changes in distribution margins and in the import share.
Second, many countries, including France, Belgium, Italy, Ireland, Japan
and the United Kingdom, regulate retail markets, especially by limiting the
size of new retail establishments. For instance, the Large Scale Retail Store
Law in Japan has long been a ﬁxture of distribution system there. It has often
been regarded as a substantial non-tariﬀ barrier to trade and has caused sig-
niﬁcant political conﬂict between Japan and exporter countries, such as the
United States (Miyagiwa, 1993). France only recently abolished the Loi Raf-
3Basker and Van (2010) ﬁnd that between 1997 and 2002 the biggest US retailers had
a more than three times higher marginal propensity to import from China than smaller
retailers. They argue that the expansion of big retailers accounts for 19% of the growth
in US imports of consumer goods from China.
4For instance, in 2003, the share of imports in Canada was 55% for clothing, 82% for
clothing accessories, 86% for footwear, 100% for audio, video, small electrical appliances,
as well as for toys and games (Jacobson, 2006, Table 33). It is precisely in these segments
that the market share of large Canadian retailers is the highest: the market shares of the
80 largest retailers in 2004 represented 61% for clothing and accessories, 68% for home
electronics, computers and cameras, 57% for housewares, 55% for toys and games and 49%
for food. On average, this share was 27% for all the products sold by Canadian retailers
(Jacobson, 2006, Table 6).
2farin, which also regulated the entry of large retailers, following complaints
about the lack of price competition at the retail level and the failure of re-
tailers to pass on falling import prices to consumers (Economist, 2008). In a
recent study, the Competition Authority (2009) in Ireland has also blamed
retail market regulations for short-changing consumers in the face of declining
import prices. In the United States, on the other hand, there is some pre-
liminary evidence that the relatively poor consumers have beneﬁtted from
the existence of large retailers importing cheap products from developing
countries (Broda and Romalis, 2009). By explicitly accounting for retailer
heterogeneity, our model allows us to examine how such regulations aﬀect
retail market structure, imports, retail prices and, ultimately, welfare. We
show that retail regulations may indeed have strong adverse eﬀects on import
volumes, consumer prices and welfare.
The basic mechanism at play in our model depends on economies of
scale in importing, speciﬁcally ﬁxed costs associated with sourcing goods
from abroad. In the presence of such ﬁxed costs, reductions in import
prices, whether due to reductions in trade barriers or declining transport
and communication costs, beneﬁt large retailers disproportionately, because
only these retailers can aﬀord to pay the ﬁxed costs associated with import-
ing. And by making large retailers more competitive, lower import prices
tend to squeeze out smaller retailers.
The presence of economies of scale in importing is suggested by the fact
that large retailers source a rising share of their goods directly from abroad
and not through domestic sourcing (either by buying domestically produced
goods or products imported through independent intermediaries, such as
wholesalers or domestic subsidiaries of foreign exporters). A recent survey
of Austrian, German and Swiss retailers (Zentes, Hilt and Domma, 2007)
indicates that direct importing is indeed mostly done by large retailers, the
largest of which operate their own overseas buying oﬃces.5 It also argues
that direct importing is associated with signiﬁcantly lower variable costs,
as it allows retailers to bypass additional layers of intermediaries through
buying oﬃces that can directly identify the lowest-cost supplier for speciﬁc
items. The reason why only big retailers choose the direct import channel is,
of course, that it is associated with large ﬁxed costs. These include costs of
5The survey covers 86 retailers in Germany, Austria and Switzerland (accounting for
about 50% of total retail sales). It shows that direct imports by retailers accounted for
26-29% of total sourcing in 2006, while indirect imports accounted for 35-37% of total
sourcing.
3operating buying oﬃces, searching for suppliers, developing products, spec-
ifying product standards, training suppliers, and monitoring quality.6 Evi-
dence from Canadian retailing also suggests that it is the large retailers that
carry out the lion’s share of direct importing. In NAICS 4481-83 (Clothing,
Shoes, Jewelry, Luggage and Leather Goods), for example, the largest 5%
of the retail establishments (by employment) that engage in direct imports
in that sector account for 76.3% of the direct sectoral imports from low-cost
Asian countries.7
Our paper is linked to the literature in the following way. Retail mar-
kets have been investigated by Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) who show
that establishments tend to be larger in larger markets. They also suggest
that the dispersion of establishment sizes is well approximated by a Pareto
distribution. The role of international trade on retailers has been analyzed
by Basker and Van (2008) who investigate the eﬀects of trade liberalization
on competition between a chain retailer and small single-market retailers.
They ﬁnd that trade liberalization raises the size of the chain retailer, and
that the growth of the chain gives an additional boost to imports. There are
two main diﬀerences between our paper and that of Basker and Van. First,
while Basker and Van endogenize the size of the retail chain, speciﬁcally the
number of stores it operates, and relate it to the intensive margin of imports,
we work with a continuous distribution of retailers, which also allows us to
capture the extensive margin of imports. Second, whereas the eﬃciency of
the retail chain is exogenously given in Basker and Van, the productivity
distribution of retailers is endogenous in our model, allowing us to examine
how trade liberalization aﬀects retail eﬃciency and retail prices.
Other papers examining the interaction between trade liberalization and
retail market structure include Raﬀ and Schmitt (2009) who study the ef-
fects of trade liberalization on the volume of imports and social welfare in
an oligopoly model in which retailers have greater or lesser bargaining power
6Buying oﬃces can indeed be quite large. For instance, KarstadtQuelle AG, Germany’s
biggest apparel and sixth-largest food retailer, used to operate 23 buying oﬃces with a
total of 1,100 employees (Zentes, Hilt and Domma, 2007).
7Other sectors include: Electronics and Appliances (NAICS 4431) where 5% of the
largest retailers engaging in direct imports do import 68.2% of the sectoral imports from
low cost Asian countries, Building Material and Supplies (NAICS 4441) where the shares
are respectively 12% and 64%, and Sporting Goods, Hobby, Musical Instruments, Books,
Periodicals, Music (NAICS 4511-12) where they are 4% and 67.6%. Source: Statistics
Canada, Import Register, Catalogue R007009, 2005.
4than manufacturers. Eckel (2009) develops a general equilibrium model to
examine the eﬀects of trade on retail market structure and especially on
product variety and accessibility of retailers. In a setting where retailers
have identical costs but are spatially diﬀerentiated, he shows that trade lib-
eralization may have ambiguous eﬀects on retail markups and social welfare
because it may reduce the number of retailers, and hence increase the average
distance between consumers and stores. By contrast, our model of hetero-
geneous retailers generates clear predictions regarding the positive eﬀects of
trade liberalization.
Other related papers include Francois and Wooton (2010) who show that
market structure in distribution becomes increasingly important for trade as
tariﬀs fall; Francois, Manchin and Norberg (2008) who work in an oligopoly
framework with representative ﬁrms and empirically examine pass-through
of tariﬀ and exchange-rate changes into producer and consumer prices; and
Richardson (2004) who studies market access to retail distribution. Javor-
cik, Keller and Tybout (2008) examine the eﬀect of NAFTA on the Mexican
soaps, detergents and surfactant industry. They argue that these eﬀects were
less due to the reduction in trade costs or to the entry of foreign manufactur-
ers than to ‘the fundamental change in relationship’ between manufacturers
and retailers once Walmex (Wal-Mart of Mexico) entered the market.
Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) discuss the eﬀects of retail market regula-
tion in France, Haskel and Sadun (2009) study the eﬀect of regulation on the
productivity of UK retailing, while Schivardi and Viviano (2011) examines
the impact of retail market regulations in Italy. These papers, however, are
generally not concerned with the eﬀects of regulations on international trade.
An exception is Miyagiwa (1993), but his paper does not account for ﬁrm
heterogeneity in retailing.
The paper continues as follows. In Section 2, we present a simple model
of international trade with heterogeneous retailers. The equilibria of the
model and comparative static results for marginal changes in trade costs are
derived in Section 3. In Section 4 we use the model to study the eﬀect of
retail market regulation. In Section 5 we use simulations to assess the impact
of trade liberalization on retailer concentration and social welfare both for
the case with and without retail market regulation. Section 6 concludes, and
the Appendix contains proofs.
52 The Model
In this section, we adapt Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) to develop a simple
model of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous retailers that source
the goods they distribute both domestically and abroad. Retailers sell only
in their domestic market, i.e., their services are non-traded. From the con-
sumer’s point of view, the products sold by diﬀerent retailers are diﬀerenti-
ated varieties. This could be because each retailer sells a diﬀerent bundle of
goods, or because the retailers themselves are diﬀerentiated.8 Since the focus
of our paper is on retailer heterogeneity and an endogenous market structure
in retailing, we consider retailer diﬀerentiation and keep the production side
of the economy very simple by assuming that goods are perfect substitutes
and produced by a perfectly competitive manufacturing sector. Retailer dif-
ferentiation occurs when consumers value diﬀerent retailer characteristics,
such as location, amenities, the quantity and quality of diﬀerent customer
services, etc.
There is a continuum of retailers indexed by i ∈  . All consumers share



























i denotes the quantity per capita bought from retailer i, and y the
consumption of the numeraire good. Parameter β describes the degree of sub-
stitutability between retailers. If β = 0, retailers are perfectly substitutable,




The degree of diﬀerentiation between retailers increases with β.9
Assuming that the demand for the numeraire product is positive, the
8In Eckel (2009), retailers are located around a circle and are thus spatially diﬀeren-
tiated, selling an identical bundle of diﬀerentiated products. In Raﬀ and Schmitt (2011),
each retailer sells a diﬀerent bundle of diﬀerentiated goods. In both of these papers,
however, retailers are equally productive.
9While it may seem unrealistic to assume that consumers visit a continuum of retailers
to buy a homogeneous good, the representative-consumer utility function in (1) may be
given a microfoundation in terms of an address model of product diﬀerentiation. Anderson
et al. (1992, chs. 4 and 5) demonstrate that the utility function can be reinterpreted as
arising from an address model in which each consumer buys from only one retailer, namely
the one whose address in characteristics space provides the greatest conditional indirect
utility. See also Ottaviano and Thisse (1999).
6inverse per-capita demand faced by each retailer i is




Denoting by L the number of consumers and by N the mass of active retailers,
the market demand faced by retailer i can be expressed as a function of the














  p, (3)
where






and where  ∗ is the set of active retailers.
Labor, the only factor of production, is inelastically supplied and per-
fectly mobile between the production and the retailing sectors. Since the
numeraire good is produced by a competitive industry under constant re-
turns technology and a unit labor requirement of one, the price of labor in
the economy is also equal to one. All costs are therefore expressed in terms
of labor requirements.
We assume that retailers ﬁrst decide wether to enter the market and thus
whether to incur the sunk cost FE. Upon entering, each retailer learns about
its speciﬁc level of marginal retailing cost c or, equivalently, its productivity
1/c. We assume that the distribution of c is given by G(c) with support
on [0,cM]. Since the entry cost is sunk, only entrants able to cover their
marginal cost are active in the market. All remaining entrants are inactive,
i.e., do not buy or sell any goods. Assuming that retail productivity follows







where k ≥ 1. When k = 1, the distribution is uniform on [0,cM]. As k
increases, the distribution shifts toward high marginal costs.
Once a retailer has entered the market, he has to decide whether to source
goods domestically or to import them. Imports involve a per-unit trade cost
t and a ﬁxed cost FI. This ﬁxed cost includes the cost of maintaining buying
oﬃces, cooperating with foreign partners to source goods, acquiring informa-
tion, etc. Production (domestic or foreign) involves no ﬁxed or sunk cost but
7foreign production is assumed to be cheaper than domestic production. For
simplicity, we normalize the marginal cost of foreign producers to zero, and
denote the marginal cost of domestic production by w > t.
Hence, active retailers that buy domestically maximize
(pi − c − w)qi(pi), (4)
whereas active retailers relying on imports maximize
(pi − c − t)qi(pi) − FI. (5)
Below we let superscript D indicate domestic sourcing, and I indicate im-
ports.10
Each retailer takes the mass of active retailers N and average retail price
  p as given when setting its price. Retailer i’s proﬁt-maximizing prices when
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γN+β − w, the equilibrium prices and outputs of a retailer
with marginal cost c are
p
D(c) = w +
1
2















(cD + w − c − t); (9)
10We may also interpret the good sold by retailers as a composite consumer good q
that consists of a domestic good (z), and a good (m) that may either be imported or
sourced domestically. Equations (4) and (5) and the rest of the analysis are unchanged if
one makes the following assumptions. Let goods z and m be aggregated according to the
following CES function q = (zφ + mφ)
1
φ with 0 < φ < 1; z and m are hence imperfect
substitutes with an elasticity of substitution equal to σ = 1/(1 − φ). Let the marginal
cost of z be equal to one. A retailer can source good m in two ways: First, he may buy it
domestically at price ω; this is mode D. Second, the retailer may choose direct importing.
This strategy involves a ﬁxed cost of importing, FI, and a variable cost (including the



























(cD + w − c − t)
2 − FE − FI. (11)
Only retailers with marginal costs less than or equal to cD will remain
active, because only they will be able to cover their marginal cost. Active
retailers have to select from which source to buy their goods. A retailer is
indiﬀerent between domestic sourcing and direct imports if πD(c) = πI(c).
This condition deﬁnes a critical value of the marginal cost cI,







such that ﬁrms with c ≤ cI prefer imports and ﬁrms with c > cI domestic
sourcing. We assume that cI ≤ cD so that the least eﬃcient active retailers




2 ≤ FI. (13)
We also assume that importing is more proﬁtable for the most eﬃcient re-






2 + 2cD(w − t)
￿
. (14)
These two assumptions togetherwith the quadratic formof the proﬁt function
ensure that the value of cI solving (12) is unique.
The two cut-oﬀ values of the marginal cost, cD and cI, deﬁne three cate-
gories of retailers. Retailers whose marginal cost is suﬃciently small (c ≤ cI)
import; retailers whose marginal costs are in the middle range (cI < c ≤ cD)
source goods domestically; and retailers with high marginal costs (c > cD)
are not active because they are not able to cover their marginal costs.11
11The model could easily be expanded by introducing a fourth category of retailers that
import goods indirectly through wholesalers. Wholesalers can be thought of as agents that
enable importers to reduce the ﬁxed cost of importing by providing intermediation services
to a number of retailers. For instance, if indirect importing through wholesales were















which, with the Pareto distribution, gives














Since the marginal active retailer is just indiﬀerent between buying and not
buying, we have qD(cD) = 0 and pD(cD) = w + cD. Using this price in (3),
the mass of active retailers can be calculated as
N =
β(α − w − cD)
γ(w + cD −   p)
. (17)
The mass of active retailers is related to the mass of entrants into the
retail market, NE, by the condition N = NEG(cD). In equilibrium the mass












(−FE)dG(c) = 0. (18)
3 Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
In this section we characterize the equilibrium of the model and examine
the comparative statics with regard to changes in the trade cost t. The
endogenous variables of the model are p, cD, cI and N. The equilibrium
values of these variables are given by equations (12), (16), (17) and (18).
associated with a lower ﬁxed cost than direct importing but a higher variable cost, then we
could think of indirect importers as being situated in terms of their productivity between
direct importers and retailers that source goods domestically. The main conclusions of
our paper would be unaﬀected. See Akerman (2010) for a model that explicity considers a
role for wholesalers in intermediating trade. See also Bernard et al. (2010) who quantify
the role of wholesalers and retailers in US trade, and Blum et al. (2009) for a theoretical
and empirical study of trade intermediation.
10Consider ﬁrst the zero-proﬁt condition (18). The partial derivative of
this condition with respect to cI is zero since, by deﬁnition, πI(cI) = πD(cI).
Total diﬀerentiation of this equation hence yields dcD/dt. We can then derive
dcI/dt from (12), and the marginal change in p from (16).
We obtain the following comparative static results:
Proposition 1 Trade liberalization (i) forces the least eﬃcient retailers to
become inactive (cD decreases); (ii) induces some retailers to switch to buying
imports (cI rises); and (iii) reduces the average consumer price p.
Proof: see Appendix.
The intuition for these eﬀects is as follows. A reduction in the trade cost,
ceteris paribus, raises the proﬁts of importers both in absolute terms and
relative to those retailers that source their goods domestically. Hence more
retailers will turn to imports (cI rises). To keep the zero-proﬁt condition
satisﬁed ex ante despite the fact that active retailers will ex post earn a
larger proﬁt, cD has to decrease so as to lower the probability of being an
active retailer.
Changes in t have a direct eﬀect on p, as well as indirect eﬀects through








































The ﬁrst term is the standard pass-through eﬀect: the share of direct cost
savings that an importer passes on to consumers (1/2) times the probability
that a good is being imported. This eﬀect is clearly less than one and may
be very small if the probability that a good is imported (or, equivalently,
the share of imports in consumption) is small. This probability depends in a
straightforward way on the trade cost. It also depends on the distribution of
retailing costs as summarized by parameter k. The last three terms in (19)
reﬂect the fact that trade liberalization (i) changes retailing costs and retail
markups as the least eﬃcient retailers become inactive, and (ii) increases the
likelihood that a good is being sourced from abroad. Speciﬁcally, the second
term reﬂects the fact that a reduction in t lowers the expected unit cost
of retailing. The third term indicates that a lower t reduces the markup of
domestically sourced goods. The fourth term shows that trade liberalization,
by raising the probability of importing, generates cost savings from importing
for a bigger share of consumption.
11Since these last three eﬀects are positive, the eﬀect of lower trade costs
on consumer prices may be big even if the ﬁrst term is small. In fact, we can
show the following surprising result:
Proposition 2 The rate at which a reduction in the trade cost decreases
the average consumer price may exceed unity if the ﬁxed cost of importing is
suﬃciently small.
Proof: see Appendix.
This result demonstrates that an analysis of the impact of trade liberal-
ization that is limited to the standard eﬀect, i.e., the share of cost savings
that retailers sourcing goods from abroad pass on to consumers times the im-
port share in the retail sector, may severely underestimate the actual impact.
Only if one takes into account key retail market adjustments, including the
changes in retail costs and markups spurred by the elimination of ineﬃcient
retailers and the increase in foreign sourcing, does one obtain an unbiased
estimate of the true impact.
Although these adjustments may not appear like direct impact eﬀects,
it is important to keep in mind that they are not limited to the long run
either. The analysis can also be conducted in the short run when NE is
ﬁxed. In this case, the eﬀect of t on the short-term equilibrium values of p,
cD and cI is qualitatively the same as in the long run.12 The reason is that
the selection eﬀect also works in the short run as retailers can very quickly
add or drop product lines (i.e. become active or inactive), or change their
sourcing strategies.
As we just saw, retailers that source their goods from abroad directly pass
only part of the reduction in trade costs on to consumers. Their markups,
sales and proﬁts hence rise. Retailers that buy their goods domestically, on
the other hand, are forced to cut their mark-ups, which leads to lower sales
and proﬁts. These eﬀects can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3 Trade liberalization (i) lowers the sales, mark-ups and proﬁts
of retailers that source domestically; (ii) raises the sales, mark-ups and proﬁts
of retailers that engage in direct imports.
12In the short run, the equilibrium values of p, cD and cI are given by Equations (16),
(12) and (17), where in the latter equation we substitute for N using N = NEG(cD). See
www.sfu.ca/~schmitt/paper5_shortrun.pdf for a more detailed analysis.
12Proof: see Appendix.
Firms respond to changes in expected proﬁts by entering or exiting the
retail sector. Propositions 1 and 3 indicate that trade liberalization indeed
induces changes in expected proﬁts. First, since trade liberalization reduces
cD, the likelihood of earning a positive operating proﬁt, G(cD), falls. Sec-
ond, the proﬁt earned by an importer rises and, since cI goes up, so does
the probability of being an importer. Third, the proﬁt of a retailer buying
goods domestically decreases, but so does the probability of falling into this
category.
We can use (17) to derive how the mass of active ﬁrms N changes with
marginal changes in t, keeping in mind that N is related to the equilibrium















The ﬁrst expression in parentheses represents the cost eﬀect: a fall in t
reduces the average retail cost and thus implies a higher number of active
retailers. The second expression represents the price eﬀect: a decrease in
t reduces the average retail price, which drives down the number of active
retailers. The sign of dN
dt is therefore generally ambiguous, that is, it depends
very much on the characteristics of the retail sector. However, we can prove:
Proposition 4 Trade liberalization reduces the mass of active retailers if the
ﬁxed cost of importing is suﬃciently small and the market (as measured by
α) is suﬃciently big.
Proof: see Appendix.
We will show in Section 5 that a reduction in N has important, though
not straightforward, implications for retail market concentration and social
welfare.
At this juncture, it is useful to relate brieﬂy ourassumptions and results to
stylized facts and to existing work. Foster et al. (2006) in particular ﬁnds that
there is considerable heterogeneity among retailers, that an establishment’s
productivity is fairly stable over time and that the productivity distribution
among entrants is similar to that of the incumbents. These ﬁndings are not
only consistent with our model of heterogeneous retailers but also with the
assumption that each retailer has a single productivity draw and that the set
13of retailers can be represented by a distribution with a stable parameter k.
Similarly, our Proposition 1 is consistent with the ﬁnding that it is indeed
the least eﬃcient retailers that exit the industry. Finally there is indirect
evidence that the results of Proposition 3 are important in practice. Basker
(2007) argues, for instance, that Wal-Mart, the world’s biggest retailer, is a
very inﬂuential advocate of free trade and runs one of the largest Political
Action Committees in the United States.
4 Retail Market Regulation
Heterogeneity among retailers is precisely what is needed to investigate the
eﬀects of retail-market regulations that limit the size of retail establishments
as traditionally imposed in France, Belgium, Japan, Italy, the U.K. and else-
where. We show that such regulations tend to raise average retail prices and
to reduce the impact of trade liberalization.
Examples of the kind of retail-market regulations we have in mind in-
clude the Loi Royer (1973) and Loi Raﬀarin (1996) in France. The Loi Royer
created regional zoning boards composed of local store owners, politicians
and consumer representatives to regulate the establishment of retail stores
exceeding 1000 to 1500 m2, depending on city size, and the enlargement of
existing stores (Bertrand and Kramarz, 2002). This law was modiﬁed in
1996 by the Loi Raﬀarin, which extended the authority of these boards to
stores with a size exceeding 300 m2 in an attempt to impede entry by hard
discounters (Askenazy and Weidenfeld, 2007). The intent of these laws was
to protect small retailers from the rapid structural change in the retail in-
dustry, but its ultimate eﬀect was to impede the establishment of an eﬃcient
retail sector with negative consequences for consumers and employment (see
also Bertrand and Kramarz, 2002). In 1975, Belgium enacted legislation to
restrict entry of retail establishments exceeding 1000 m2; these restrictions
were relaxed in 2004 with the adoption of the so-called ‘Ikea Law’, named
after the Swedish furniture chain that apparently faced diﬃculties in estab-
lishing large stores in Belgium (Askenazy and Weidenfeld, 2007, p. 51). In
Italy the regulation of large retail stores was handed to regional authorities
in 1998. Schivardi and Viviano (2010) ﬁnd signiﬁcantly lower retail employ-
ment and productivity but higher retail proﬁts and prices in regions where
the entry of large stores was tightly controlled. Sadun (2008), and Haskel
and Sadun (2009) study a 1996 retail-market regulation in the U.K., which
14placed speciﬁc entry constraints on stores above 2500 m2. They observe a
shift by supermarket chains to smaller stores and an accompanying signiﬁcant
negative eﬀect on productivity.
We model these types of regulation by introducing an upper bound on
retailer establishment’ sales, and thus on their size.13 Because of retailer
heterogeneity, this constraint aﬀects only the most eﬃcient retailers. Let
the maximum level of sales allowed under the regulation be denoted by ˆ q.
The interesting case to consider is where the marginal retailer that is just
constrained in its sales is an importer. All retailers that are more eﬃcient
than this marginal retailer are then obviously also constrained, and all con-
strained retailers charge the same retail price ˆ p, since at ˆ q their marginal
revenue exceeds marginal cost. Using ˆ q in (3), this price is given by




The proﬁt of a constrained retailer hence is
ˆ π(c) =
￿
cD + w −
β
L
ˆ q − c − t
￿
ˆ q − FE − FI. (22)
The critical value of the marginal cost ˆ c at which a retailer is just constrained
is deﬁned by ˆ q ≡ qI(ˆ c). Hence




At this level of marginal cost we have ˆ π(ˆ c) = πI(ˆ c).
Ceteris paribus, a tightening of the constraint raises ˆ c, which implies that
the sales constraint hits even less eﬃcient retailers. Of course, a change in
ˆ q also aﬀects the other critical levels of the marginal cost, i.e., cD and cI,
together with the other endogenous variables, p and NE. The equilibrium
values of the endogenous variables when the constraint is binding are given

















13In our static model, retailer establishment size or capacity is equivalent to sales.

















To derive the comparative static eﬀects of a marginal change in the
constraint ˆ q, consider again the zero-proﬁt condition. Since, by deﬁnition,
ˆ π(ˆ c) = πI(ˆ c) and πI(cI) = πD(cI), the partial derivatives of (24) with re-
spect to ˆ c and cI are zero. We therefore directly obtain from (24) the change
in cD for marginal changes in ˆ q. The respective changes in ˆ c and cI then
follow directly from (23) and (12). The following proposition presents these
comparative-static eﬀects:
Proposition 5 A tightening of the sales constraint ￿ q implies that the mar-
ginal active retailer, the marginal constrained retailer, and the marginal im-
porting retailer are less eﬃcient ﬁrms. (i.e., cD, ˆ c and cI rise).
Proof: see Appendix.
The ﬁrst part of the proposition is straightforward. A tighter constraint
on the sales of the most eﬃcient retailers raises the residual demand for the
unconstrained retailers. This allows retailers to remain in business that were
too ineﬃcient before. The surprising result is that a tighter sales constraint
raises retailers’ propensity to import. The reason for this is that the higher
residual demand allows retailers that before were too ineﬃcient to import
to source their goods from abroad. This increase at the extensive margin of
imports is, of course, oﬀset by a decrease at the intensive margin: a tighter
constraint reduces the import volume of eﬃcient retailers.
To determine the eﬀect of a tighter constraint on the average retail price,
we simplify (25) to obtain




















The ﬁrst four terms of this equation are the same as in (16). The ﬁfth term
is an additional term reﬂecting the direct eﬀect of the output constraint.
It represents the extra expected markup of a constrained ﬁrm times the
probability that a ﬁrm is constrained conditional on its cost being less than
cD.
16The change in the average retail price induced by a tighter constraint
comes from changes in the cut-oﬀ values ˆ c, cD and cI. A tighter ˆ q raises all
three cut-oﬀ values. This has the following implications. An increase in ˆ c
means that a larger fraction of retailers becomes constrained and thus has
higher prices than without the constraint. The increase in cD also raises ˆ p,
since at the margin less eﬃcient retailers remain active in the market. The
rise in cI works against the ﬁrst two eﬀects. Retailers are more likely to
source goods from abroad, which is associated with lower variable costs than
sourcing goods domestically. One would expect that the ﬁrst two eﬀects
dominate the last one, so that a tightening of the sales constraint raises
the average retail price. Formally, we can show that it is indeed the case
if either (w − t) is big and/or FI is small so that the retailers switching to
importing have a relatively high unit retailing cost compared with the rest
of the industry and thus have only a small market share.
We formally state these suﬃcient conditions in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 A tightening of the sales constraint ￿ q raises the average retail
price ˆ p, if (w − t) is suﬃciently big and/or FI is suﬃciently small.
Proof: see Appendix.
Retail-market regulation also aﬀects the transmission of changes in import
into consumer prices. Since, from (21), ￿ p = cD + w − (β/L)￿ q, the prices of
constrained retailers are not aﬀected at all by the import price, even though
we assumed that these retailers do in fact import their goods. The reason
for this is that the sales of these ﬁrms are below the level at which marginal
revenue equals marginal cost, so that small changes in marginal cost have no
eﬀect on sales or prices.
In the extreme case where the constraint is so restrictive that it aﬀects
all importing ﬁrms, trade liberalization has no impact whatsoever on the
average retail price even if the import share in the total consumption basket
of households is large. Thus, even if retail-market regulation induces a larger
mass of retailers to source from abroad, its impact on the most eﬃcient
retailers makes the average retail price less sensitive to variations in import
prices, at least if the constraint is suﬃciently tight (i.e., for ￿ q suﬃciently close
to qI(cI)). This result can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 7 Retail-market regulation reduces the pass-through of lower
trade costs into the average retail price if the output constraint is suﬃciently
tight.
175 Retail Market Concentration and Welfare
In Section 4, we argued that the number of active retailers may decrease with
trade liberalization. Even if the number of active retailers rises, concentration
in retailing could still increase because of the impact of lower trade costs on
the size dispersion of retailers. But then would social welfare rise or fall?
The same question also arises in connection with retail-market regulation,
since it is often a goal of this regulation to lower, or at least to keep low, the
degree of market concentration in retailing.
To investigate these issues, we use simulations. In the context of the
present model, the Herﬁndahl index, H, is an ideal measure of market con-
centration. This is because this index takes into account the entire size
distribution of the retailing sector and thus both the mass of active retailers
as well as the dispersion of retailer size. Indeed, the Herﬁndahl index, deﬁned
as the sum of the squares of all retailers’ market shares, can be re-written as
H =
σ2
q/  q2 + 1
N
, (27)
where   q denotes average sales of active retailers and σ2
q is the variance of
retail sales (see Waterson, 1984). This formulation of H reveals the separate
eﬀects on concentration stemming from the mass of active retailers and from
the impact of retailers’ size dispersion. Thus, in a market with heterogeneous
retailers, market concentration as measured by the Herﬁndahl index is neg-
atively related to the mass of active retailers, N, and positively related to
the coeﬃcient of variation of retail sales, σq/  q. Since 0 ≤ H ≤ 1, industry
concentration is high if a few big retailers account for a large fraction of sales.
Social welfare in the current model is best captured by the following
indirect utility function:


















p denotes the variance of retail prices. Welfare is obviously decreasing
in   p and increasing in N and σ2
p (see Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008).
It is often presumed that a decrease in H corresponds to an increase in U.
This presumption rests on the idea that a decrease in H is associated with
an increase in competition and thus with a smaller social deadweight loss.
It is easy to see that such a simple one-to-one relationship between H and
18U does not necessarily exist in the present model with heterogeneous retail-
ers following a shock such as trade liberalization. This is the case because
there is no simple negative relationship between p and q when N varies and
because σ2
q and/or σ2
p can rise with trade liberalization. Thus, unless trade
liberalization changes the mass of retailers in a way that clearly dominates
its eﬀects on the size variation of retailers, it is quite possible that social
welfare may increase, even if trade liberalization increases retail market con-
centration. Clearly, retailer heterogeneity plays a key role in this seemingly
contradictory message regarding the Herﬁndahl index and social welfare.
We illustrate these possibilities in Figures 1a and 1b. In the ﬁrst Figure,
both welfare (measured by U net of income I) and H monotonically rise with
trade liberalization. Welfare increases despite a decrease in the number of
active retailers, N.14 This occurs because the average price, p, falls a lot as
the trade barrier comes down due to the diﬀerent eﬀects captured by (19).
Two forces explain why H rises with trade liberalization: the decrease in the
number of active retailers and an increase in the variance of sales, σ2
q.
Figure 1b illustrates the more standard case where trade liberalization
monotonically raises welfare and lowers the Herﬁndahl index. Trade liber-
alization still leads to a decrease in the average retail price but, unlike the
previous case, it raises the mass of active retailers. Although H falls with
trade liberalization, its decrease is small as trade liberalization raises retailer
size dispersion. Clearly, in the present model, the Herﬁndahl index is not a
reliable indicator of the social welfare impact of trade liberalization. More
importantly for our purpose, the simulations show that welfare rises with
trade liberalization even if retail market concentration increases.
Consider now the eﬀects of market regulation restricting the size of the
most eﬃcient retailers. Using the case illustrated by Figure 1b, we assume
that the maximum sales volume allowed by regulation, ￿ q, corresponds to
75% of the unconstrained free-trade sales of the most eﬃcient retailer (i.e.
with c = 0).15 Of course, such a constraint aﬀects more than just the most
eﬃcient retailers but it does so with a smaller relative impact, since less
eﬃcient retailers are smaller. Indeed, retailers with a volume of sales less
than ￿ q are not aﬀected at all. Table 1 shows the percentage changes with
respect to the benchmark case without regulation for diﬀerent levels of the
14And despite a decrease in σ2
p. The underlying parameters in the ﬁgures are L = 5,
FI = .1, w = .25, cM = 5, α = 1.75, β = .9, γ = .6, and k = 1.
15In the above example, this corresponds to a maximum sales volume allowed by regu-
lation equal to ￿ q = 1.83.
19trade cost.
Table 1: Impact of regulation
t ￿ p ￿ q N H U − I
0 +11% -16% +14% -28% -14%
.05 +9% -16% +13% -22% -15%
.1 +8% -16% +13% -19% -16%
.15 +7% -15% +12% -17% -17%
.2 +6% -15% +11% -16% -17%
The regulation has striking eﬀects on both the level of the variables and
on the impact of trade liberalization. It signiﬁcantly increases the number of
active retailers, N, and decreases H relative to the benchmark case. In this
sense, the introduction of the regulation achieves its goal. Consumers, how-
ever, are hurt since they face higher average prices and lower social welfare
than in the benchmark case. Regulation also aﬀects the impact of trade lib-
eralization. Even if it still leads to lower prices and a greater average volume
of sales, the impact of freer trade is very much muted since the average retail
price decreases to a much smaller extent and the average quantity sold by
retailers increases much less than without the regulation. Despite its impact
on concentration and on the number of retailers, the overall impact of the
regulation is a smaller increase in social welfare through trade liberalization
than in the absence of such a regulation.
6 Conclusions
Our paper has two important messages. The ﬁrst one is that the impact of
trade liberalization depends very much on the structure of the retailing sector
and how this sector adjusts to trade liberalization. To show this, we used a
simple model where there is no adjustment on the production side, the tra-
ditional source of adjustment to trade liberalization, so that we could focus
our attention solely on the structure of the retailing industry with heteroge-
neous retailers. Because buying foreign products involves a ﬁxed cost, only
the most eﬃcient retailers source goods from abroad. Trade liberalization
then shifts retail sales, mark-ups and proﬁts toward big retailers that engage
in direct imports at the expense of small ones that source domestically only.
This tends to raise the variance of retail sales and may lead to higher re-
tail market concentration, as measured by the Herﬁndahl Index. The model
20provides not only clear predictions concerning the sensitivity of retail prices
to variations in import prices, but it also tells us the source of these adjust-
ments. Whether adjustments are due to retailers switching the sourcing of
their purchases, or because the mass of them is aﬀected, the model suggests
that retailer heterogeneity plays an important role in explaining how much
consumers beneﬁt from trade liberalization. The importance of the retailing
sector for our understanding of trade liberalization can also be seen when
analyzing the impact of regulation. Restrictions on the size of retailers can
be viewed as neutralizing part of the endogenous response of the retailing
sector to external shocks such as trade liberalization. We show that such
a restriction impacts both the level of key indicators, such as average retail
prices and social welfare, but also mutes the eﬀect of trade liberalization in
a way that is detrimental to consumers.
The second message is that, although stylized, the model is helpful to
understand how freer trade may have aﬀected diﬀerently some countries. In
countries, including France and Japan, there is a tradition of protecting small
local retailers by placing barriers on the expansion and particularly on the size
of large retailers, whereas such restrictions typically do not exist in countries
like the United States or Canada. Not surprisingly, restrictions on the volume
of sales aﬀect ﬁrst and foremost the eﬃcient retailers. We show that this
allows ineﬃcient retailers to remain active and makes the average retail price
higher than it would otherwise be. Interestingly this makes the incentives to
source products from abroad stronger for less eﬃcient retailers, not weaker.
We also show that it makes the retail price level less sensitive to changes
in the price of imported products. With higher average retail prices and a
lower sensitivity of retail prices to foreign shocks, it should not be surprising
if French consumers feel that their ‘pouvoir d’achat’ (purchasing power) has
suﬀered as compared to consumers elsewhere in Europe (Economist, 2008).
The contrast with the United States is striking. Broda and Romalis
(2009) show that because poor US households have a diﬀerent composition
of their consumption basket than rich households and because the price index
of the poor’s consumption basket has declined relative to that of the rich, the
impact of the rise in income inequality has been signiﬁcantly smaller than ﬁrst
feared. It seems fairly clear that this would not have been possible without
the instrumental role played by large retailers importing a large volume of
products from low-cost Asian countries.
These two examples underline well the signiﬁcant impact of the retailing
sector in a more integrated world. Simply put, in the United States, the
21large retailers seem to allow poor consumers to keep up with the Joneses
whereas in France consumers feel cheated by the retailers and do not perceive
much beneﬁt from globalization. Of course much more needs to be done to
understand the role and the impact of the retailing sector in today’s world.
This is left for future research.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
















































D(w +cD −p) > 0 and w −t+cD −
kcI
k+1 > 0 due
to w > t, cD > cI and k < 1 + k.
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dt < 0 provided c
1+k
D (w − t + cD − cI) > (w − t)c
1+k
I which holds
since w > t and cD > cI.




































since all the terms on the RHS are positive.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the minimum value of FI consistent with (13). In this case, cD = cI,
dcI
dt = 0, and
dcD










By continuity, dp/dt > 1 for FI suﬃciently close to its minimum value.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Diﬀerentiating (8) and (10) with respect to t and using (30), it is easy to


















Next, we show that
dcD




(1 + k)(w − t) + cD + k(cD − cI)





















k = 1, this inequality reduces to (cD − cI)2 > 0, and when k > 1, the RHS
of the above inequality increases faster than the LHS. Since 0 <
dcD
dt < 1, it
























The result on mark-ups follows immediately, as mark-ups are proportional
to output.
237.4 Proof of Proposition 4
After substituting for p and
dp


















































For FI equal to its lower bound (see (13)), we have cD = cI,
dcI
dt = 0, and
dcD





























= sign{k(α − w − cD) − cD}.





> 0 if α is suﬃciently
big.
7.5 Proof of Proposition 5











(k+1) + (w − t)ck
I
￿ < 0. (34)
















247.6 Proof of Proposition 6






































dˆ q < 0 and cD(1 + k) − kˆ c > 0, we have
d￿ p
dˆ q < 0 if the second term is
suﬃciently small. Using (12), the second term can be written as:





























dˆ q < 0 provided that FI is small and/or (w − t) is big enough.
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